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This is a brief account of a completely unknown Danish entrepreneur, Harald Schou-
Kjeldsen, who first went to Russia as young trade official attached to the Royal Danish 
Embassy in Petrograd from 1915-1919 and lived there – there being of course Soviet 
Russia by now – from 1922 to 1934. In this latter period he ran various import-export 
businesses; he reputedly met Lenin; renovated the abandoned mansion of the illustrious 
jeweller to the Russian Tsar, Fabergé; and set up a button factory, employing at its peak 
some 350 workers. Schou-Kjeldsen’s life in the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1934 
provides a remarkable picture of how the shift from NEP to Stalinism adversely affected 
foreign private enterprise and, in his case, stifled it. The account concludes that Schou-
Kjeldsen, as a resourceful entrepreneur in an adversarial  business environment, has a 
special claim to be a role-model for foreign business people operating in the not entirely 





This is a brief account of a completely unknown Danish entrepreneur, Harald Schou-
Kjeldsen (1895-1963), who first went to Russia as young trade official attached to the 
Royal Danish Embassy in Petrograd from 1915-1919 and lived there – there being of 
course Soviet Russia by now – from 1922 to 1934. His life in Russia, which is the 
subject of a short book I am writing, is of interest for several reasons. It is, first, in a 
sense a product of the extraordinary relationship which developed between Denmark 
and Russia as of the latter half of the 19th century until the Russian Revolution of 1917. 
Second, his activities as an entrepreneur from 1922 to 1934 are sufficiently well 
documented so that we can trace his activities fairly seamlessly. It is in effect the story 
of the crushing of a businessman in the first years of the great experiment of socialism. 
Third, the evidence available suggests that Schou-Kjeldsen’s experiences of coping with 
Russia in the formative years of the socialist existence bear resemblance to analogous 
experiences in the formative years of post-Soviet Russia as a market economy some 
seven decades later. In this sense Schou-Kjeldsen is to some degree a role-model to 
today’s foreign entrepreneurs in a Russia which is perjoratively referred to as ‘the wild 
East.’ 
 
Material on the life and times of Harald Schou-Kjeldsen is drawn from (a) family 
records, to which I have access, including albums, diaries, letters and other 
correspondence, (b)  the oral and written testimony of his son, Igor (1919-2001), and 
daughter, Inger, (b. 1922), and (c) documents in the Danish State Archive, which I 
consulted in February 2001. I am otherwise in the process of securing further 
information about my protagonist in the Russian national archives in Moscow. For 
information on the sources used in this paper, please refer to the bibliography. 
  
Background: The Danish dream 
 
As of the early 1880s  Danish entrepreneurs were beginning to show a serious interest in 
the Russian empire and within a matter of years several Danish had concerns taken up 
solid positions there. Already the Danish Great Northern Telegraph Company had 
constructed constructed a telegraph system across Russia, thus linking Europe with the 
Far East. Danish dairymen (some hired direct by the Russian government) and butter 
wholesalers set up businesses in Siberia, settling along the Trans-Siberian Railway, 
which was opened in 1895. Omsk was the centre of operations, but Danish businessmen 
and agriculturalists were active in some other 40 Siberian towns. In those times Danish 
enterprise had a remarkable patroness, no lesser person than the Empress of Russia, the 
Danish princess Dagmar, wife of the Tsar Alexander III and mother of the ill-fated 
Nicholas II. After the Russian Revolution of 1917 and her repatriation to Denmark in 
1919 the former empress would be seen as a severe liability to Danish political and 
commercial circles bent on doing business with the newly established Soviet state.  
 
At the turn of the century Alexander Foss, a director of F. L. Smidth & Co., which had 
substantial commercial and manufacturing involvements in Russia, and chairman of the 
Industrial Society of Denmark, pronounced  that Denmark’s industrial future lay in 
Russia. In this he was supported by the Danish Association of Iron Manufacturers. But 
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no-one caught the excitement better than the Danish author Holger Rosenberg who 
journeyed to Siberia and subsequently wrote The new Siberia, which was published in 
1904. He summed up his vision thus: 
 
‘Just as a fresh stream through a neglected garden makes everything flower, the lushest 
vegetation is already sprouting around the rows of tracks of the Siberian railroad. Old 
towns that once stagnated are growing again, putting forth new branches and setting 
fruit, and new towns are sprouting up like asparagus in May. There is movement and 
speed in this growth, as there was in America’s priarie towns when the Pacific railroad 
opened up old America.’ 
 
‘Siberia is the new America’, was his paean and call to arms 
 
By 1905, the year of Russia’s fateful defeat in the Russo-Japanese War, it was clear to 
Danish business circles that Russia represented ‘a colossal market for Danish 
production and for the disposal of foreign goods via Copenhagen.’  By the outbreak of 
the First World War in 1914 the population of the Russian Empire was about 170 
million. The population of Denmark was a mere two million. According to historian 
Bent Jensen, the Russian Empire was ‘in a manner of speaking a natural area for 
colonisation by Denmark and by dynamic, enterprising Danes’. Around this time some 
2,250 Danish citizens lived and worked in Russia, involved in key sectors such as 
telegraphy, shipping, agriculture, timber, munitions, chemicals and construction.  
 
In Denmark itself interest in Russia was unabated even after the outbreak of the First 
World War. In 1917 the Danish Association of Cattle-breeders formed a permanent 
committee to promote exports of Danish breeding stock to Russia. On another front 
Russian studies flourished not only in Copenhagen University but also in the country’s 
leading commercial colleges, in Copenhagen and Århus, where Russian language 
courses were said to be ‘very popular.’ From 1915 to 1917 one of the leading 
newspapers, Berlingske Tidende, produced a monthly supplement in Danish and 
Russian on export opportunities for Danish firms in Russia. In the words of historian 
Bent Jensen there was ‘an unshakable faith in Russia as the golden future for Danish 
industry’.  
 
That latter remark must, however, be put into perspective. Denmark was a country 
which had seen itself dwindle from the 17th century from Baltic empire to modest 
Scandinavian kingdom in the 19th century. Especially painful was the loss of the 
provinces of Schleswig and Holstein to Germany in 1864. This burning humiliation was 
described as nothing less than ‘amputation at the hip.’ By making Russia – vast, unruly, 
turbulent Russia  - its commercial playground  Denmark would be restored to long 
deserved Baltic eminence with port city of Copenhagen as the great hub. That was the 
golden future that Russia offered.  
 
Harald Schou-Kjeldsen in Russia: 1915 to 1919 
 
When Schou-Kjeldsen joined the Royal Danish Embassy in Petrograd in 1915, 
Denmark’s commercial ambitions in Russia were boundless. If Denmark were quick to 
point out her neutral status in the war, she was equally quick to take advantage of any 
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commercial benefit that that neutrality might secure: especially, of course, at the 
expense of Germany, Russia’s adversary and the loathed plunderer of Danish provinces 
some 50 years earlier. Indeed Danish entrepreneurs were looking forward to ‘the war 
after the war’, referring to the battle for the huge Russian market upon cessation of 
hostilities, from which Germany would be excluded. Materials in the Danish State 
Archive make several references to Schou-Kjeldsen, but give no clear picture of his 
official duties. But we do get a glimpse of his other activities in a copy of his family 
newsletter published in his home town of Hobro in Jutland. In the September 1917 issue 
7 of this newsletter we read:  
 
‘The secretary of the Danish commercial attaché in Petrograd, Harald Schou-Kjeldsen, 
is currently visiting home and is staying at the Park Hotel. He has held this position 
since May 1915. Beyond that, for the last two years he has run his own firm dealing in 
particular machinery and iron mongery and has been doing business with Denmark and 
Sweden. He has since sold this firm to a joint stock company by name of Vulkan (which 
used to be a joint stock company known as Skaarup) of Århus, for which company he is 
taken up the position of sole manager for Russia of the Danish-Russia Cinematograph 
Company with offices in Petrograd and Moscow. Moreover the 21 year old entrepreneur 
is employing about 30 people at his offices. The purpose of his visit here … has been to 
start an affiliate company called ‘Schou-Kjeldsen Petrograd’, which is primarily 
concerned with the import of various varieties of seed from Russia.’ 
 
This item raises some points of interest. Schou-Kjeldsen appears to have no problems 
combining his job a minor diplomat in Russia with the pursuit of his own business 
activities. In fact historian Bent Jensen, Denmark’s expert on Danish-Russian relations, 
makes it clear that it was considered normally for trade officials to run business on their 
own account. Schou-Kjeldsen’s activities covered three areas: exporting of 
manufactured items from Denmark and Sweden to Russia (it is not clear what kind of 
machinery he handled); promotion and sales of cinematic films in Russia, and the 
importation of some Russian products, notably oil-cakes and timber. 
 
In order to keep these activities in motion, the young man already had, as noted, some 
30 people working for him in both Petrograd and Moscow. All this suggests a 
determined and well-organised person with an eye for commercial opportunities. It is 
impossible not to draw the conclusion that Schou-Kjeldsen was a tireless worker and 
that he was an eager and successful networker in a country, where, as Hermod Lannung, 
the idealistic contemporary of Schou-Kjeldsen, noted, enterprise was continually 
rebuffed by great inertia and a bureaucratic mentality.  
 
What is of more than passing interest is Schou-Kjeldsen’s interest in cinematic film, the 
new mass entertainment which was sweeping the country like wild-fire. Indeed in 
Russia’s main cities the audiences for films exceeded that for all other forms of public 
entertainment in Russia’s towns put together. In fact the demand was not just for films, 
but also for film stock and equipment, most of which had to be imported. In the family 
records Inger has a letter from Schou-Kjeldsen to his wife-to-be Elinor written in 1918 
on the headed paper of the Russian-Danish Cinematographic Company. The letter is 
personal, but the headed paper is also a valuable source in Russian of the activities of 
the company.  
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The letter head tells us that the company sold films made in Russia, England, America, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Denmark. It also supplied ‘all possible 
cinematographic equipment’, including ‘lamps, lanterns, motors, rheostats and 
transformers as well as tripods of every possible size.’ It is a very great shame that we 
have no more details of how successful Schou-Kjeldsen was at this side of the film 
business. The family of Schou-Kjeldsen has preserved a Russian-language 
advertisement of August 1917 about the company, which shows the names of seven 
films being promoted by the Russian-Danish Cinematographic Company. As well as 
announcing current films such as ‘In the vortex of crime’ or ‘The lady behind the black 
veil’, the displays the company logo: a Russian bear on all fours and diagonally 
opposite him is a seated dog; almost certainly a great Dane. It is a rare example of two 
countries’ most potentially ferocious beasts being depicted in peaceable contact with 
each other. 
 
When the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917, Schou-Kjeldsen probably thought, 
like almost everybody else, that the party of Lenin was too extreme to form a lasting 
government. Soviet power was expected to be in Bent Jensen’s memorable phrase 
nothing more than ‘a  bizarre intermezzo.’ But within weeks Russia was in turmoil and 
locked in civil war. There can be no doubt that Schou-Kjeldsen’s business activities 
became increasingly precarious as the war dragged on, and by the revolutionary summer 
of 1917 he may well have felt that the coming upheavals – for everybody sensed that 
something was going to happen – may not augur well for him, at least in the short term. 
After the Revolution he may have thought that the Communist take-over could be very 
bad for business indeed. But, if he thought that, he would have been out of touch with 
mainstream Danish opinion. 
 
For example, in December 1917 there was a long series of articles in the leading Danish 
newspaper, Berlingske Tidende, about Danish business interests in Russia following the 
Revolution of a few weeks earlier. ‘Have our investments and prospects been 
undermined?’ it rhetorically asked it readers. No, came their reply. A string of 
interviews with firms and personnel who were connected with significant business 
ventures in Russia affirmed that Russia was still seen as ‘a land of the future’ for the 
Danish economy. In the meantime the Danish government, all too mindful of the scale 
of Danish business involvements in Russia, adopted – for the time being at least – a 
strongly neutral stance vis-à-vis the newly installed Soviet authorities so as not to 
jeopardise Denmark’s immediate prospects. But this position could not be upheld for 
long. The Danish ambassador was soon to find himself lodging official protests when 
either the Soviet government or local sources of power issued decrees which were 
detrimental to Danish economic interests.  
 
So it was that in January 1918 the Danish ambassador was instructed to clarify the 
Soviet government’s policy regarding the take-over of the assets of private banks by the 
Russian State Bank: an action which directly affected the Great Northern Telegraph 
Company and other Danish businesses in Russia. He did not get much joy overall, but 
eventually the Great Northern did succeed in getting money out of the Russian State 
Bank. This is in itself an early indicator of the special status as a foreign business 
enterprise that Great Northern would enjoy throughout the early years of the Soviet 
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régime. Even so the Danish vision of Russia as the land of the future was still far from 
being shattered, but it was shaken. 
 
After the Revolution, as Russia descended into general turmoil, Schou-Kjeldsen was not 
immediately repatriated. He remained one of the few personnel at the Danish Embassy 
in Petrograd. By 1918 the embassies of several countries hostile to the new Soviet 
regime were closed. But the embassy of Denmark, which was not closed for the time 
being, took over the interests of a number of Western countries. Schou-Kjeldsen, at the 
age of 23 found himself the vice-consul of France and also represented the affairs of 
Belgium. In this capacity he managed to save the lives of 10 French and Belgian 
citizens in Saratov, who were destined for a firing squad. For his valour, which entailed 
humouring a gun-toting commissar and capitalist-hating wife, Schou-Kjeldsen was 
awarded the Knight of the Black Star by the French Government. For this and other 
exploits an unsigned memorandum in the Danish State Archive notes Schou-Kjeldsen’s 
‘very considerable and meritorious work on behalf of French interests.’ It is not known, 
incidentally, to what extent he was involved with the spiriting out of Russia in 1919 of 
the former empress Marie Federovna to her native Denmark. 
 
The material preserved in the Danish State Archive suggests that Schou-Kjeldsen was 
indeed one of the last Danish diplomats to stay on, and he left Russia with a vice-consul 
called Berg. It appears that both men were told to leave Russia at very short notice. 
According to Elinor, Schou-Kjeldsen’s wife, an official told them: ‘If I were you, I 
would get out of Russia’. A note in the state archive made by Berg reveals that both 
men managed to cross the border into Finland just fifteen minutes before the Russian 
frontier guards were instructed to arrest them. 
 
Schou-Kjeldsen would not set foot in Russia again until 1922. In the intervening three 
years he set up his own import-export business in Copenhagen. We have no record of 
what these business activities were. But one thing is certain: he was planning to return 
sooner or later to the Russia of Lenin and the Bolsheviks. By now, of course, the Danish 
dream was well and truly shattered. 
 
Russia 1922 to 1934: motivations and unsual assignments 
 
It is not entirely clear why Schou-Kjeldsen returned to Russia in 1922.  This was still a 
Russia which lagged behind the West exactly like the Russia of the Tsars. But it was 
now Soviet Russia, which had, thanks to Karl Marx and Lenin, understood the laws of 
history and was now poised to be the vanguard of new kind of society, in which science 
supplanted religion, in which the industrial proletariat articulated the needs of ‘decent’ 
people, and in which – most importantly – the communist party was the leading 
architect of social progress and economic development.  
 
But it was also since 1921 the country of NEP, the New Economic Policy, which 
pragmatically permitted some forms of private enterprise until the economy sufficiently 
recovered to be ready for the real transition to socialism. Under NEP, which reached its 
peak in 1925-26, foreign business people with contacts and expertise were generally 
welcomed in the Soviet Union. But with the initiation of the First Five Year Plan in 
1928 and the consolidation of absolute power into the hands of Stalin from about the 
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same time socialism could no longer be compromised. Consequently Schou-Kjeldsen’s 
life in the Soviet Union from 1922 to 1934 provides a remarkable picture of how the 
shift from NEP to Stalinism affected foreign private enterprise and, in his case, stifled it. 
 
Like many Danish entrepreneurs in pre-war Russia, Schou-Kjeldsen had lost property, 
belongings and various forms of investment there. It seems that he wanted in particular 
to recover a mansion in his possession in Moscow. But there may have been a further 
motive for the move back to Russia. According to a note written by his wife, Elinor, 
Schou-Kjeldsen attended a conference in Geneva in June 1922, at which the Leon 
Trotsky, one of Lenin’s closest associates and a fervent believer in world revolution, 
invited people to consider settling in Soviet Russia. It is safe to assume that Trotsky had 
uppermost in his mind ideological fellow-travellers who wished to see revolution spread 
throughout  Europe. It may have surprised him that a young Danish businessman saw 
the world’s first communist state as a marketplace. There is, however, every reason to 
speculate that Schou-Kjeldsen was in any case planning to return to Russia. It seems 
unlikely, however, that Trotsky was a decisive influence. 
 
Upon his return to Russia in 1922, Schou-Kjeldsen and his family – a wife and two 
babies - settled in a handsome mansion in Kammenyi Ostrov (‘Stone Island’) in the 
newly named Leningrad. Once the residence of a  vastly rich aristocrat,  the mansion 
had a tennis court and garage that could accommodate six cars. The Soviet authorities 
supplied two maids and a chauffeur, the latter being a former Tsarist general. All three 
made routine reports to the innocuously named ‘State Political Administration’, alias 
the GPU, the secret police. Somehow Schou-Kjeldsen had managed to import two cows 
so that the family  had fresh milk every day. It is surprising to learn that these cows 
were kept on an island of the Neva delta and not in the garden of the family mansion. In 
the 1920s in a country where food was so scarce and disease rife,  Schou-Kjeldsen’s 
cows would have needed to be watched permanently against abduction or even 
slaughter. 
 
Schou-Kjeldsen set about his business with his customary energy. His first big deal 
brought him in a sense face to face with the chaos that the Civil War had caused. There 
was a crisis in agriculture. Cattle were starving. He was asked by the communist 
authorities  to supply oil-cakes to Russia, whereupon he contacted a British company, 
which was able to ship the oil-cakes, and for this it won from the Soviet government a 
remarkable concession. It was permitted to take unlimited amounts of timber – virtually 
entire stands of beech and oak - from a huge tract of Russia for a 10 years’ period.  The 
deal went ahead and seemingly with few problems.  
 
Then around 1924 he obtained permission to restore, in his wife’s Elinor’s description, 
four large houses in Leningrad. When we learn that one of these four houses was the 
home of the renowned imperial jeweller, Carl Fabergé, we are plainly talking about 
residences of considerable size and distinction. Schou-Kjeldsen cannot have received 
permission to touch these properties unless he had close contact with the Soviet 
authorities and unless those authorities believed him to be trustworthy, even though he 
was, strictly speaking, a class enemy. 
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There can be no doubt that Schou-Kjeldsen knew precisely who Fabergé was. 
According to Inger, her father discovered in the house of Fabergé a globe in which the 
master-jeweller had hidden a number of valuable objets d’art. With the apparent 
knowledge and blessing of the Soviet authorities, Schou-Kjeldsen took charge of these 
objects and managed to get them out of Russia and into Denmark. He was, however, 
forbidden to remove Fabergé’s Steinway piano. Many of the creations acquired by 
Schou-Kjeldsen were later sold by him in the 1930s, when the family, having returned 
from Russia, needed money. Other items were sold by Elinor and Inger after Schou-
Kjeldsen’s death. The family records show that the last two Fabergé items in the 
family’s possession, a pair of  lampshades,  was sold through Christie’s in 1985. 
 
Fabergé was apparently not the only world-famous name to be associated with Schou-
Kjeldsen in Soviet Russia in the early 1920s. According to Igor, his father had two 
meetings with Lenin himself in 1922 and 1923, but this seems improbable. Lenin, who 
died in 1924, was by then a shadow of his former self, slowly dying from brain disease 
from which he had been suffering from 1922. His illness aside, it is remarkable to think 
of the founder of the Soviet state bothering with the likes of a young Danish 
entrepreneur. But the story, no doubt apocryphal, says a lot for Schou-Kjeldsen’s 
reputation – and effectiveness of personal network, come to that - among senior 
communist officials who obviously made the meetings possible. He must have had 
exceptional interpersonal skills, charm (which Russians easily fall for), and redoubtable 
persistence.  
 
Schou-Kjeldsen was always on the look-out for new business opportunities. It will be 
recalled that before the Russian Revolution of 1917 he had represented the interests of 
the Danish-Russian Film Company. In the 1920s he again promoted silent films in the 
1920s, finding a market for Danish comedy films which were wildly popular across 
Europe. The stars were Fytårn or just Fy (‘the tall one’) and Bivogn or just Bi (‘the 
short one’), known in Soviet Russia as Pat and Patachon and featured in ‘startling 
posters overhead’ in the major cities. Their slap-stick humour was greatly enjoyed. But 
around 1926 the watch-dog body Sovkino condemned the films as an unacceptable 
pastiche of the industrial proleriat. That seemed to spell the end of that business activity. 
 
According to a Russian document from the state archives in Moscow dated 6 November 
1926, in March 1923 Schou-Kjeldsen formed a company with a Russian associate, one 
G. L.  Kobylyanskii, which traded in ‘farinaceous products and colonial goods.’ This 
venture was closed in the autumn of the following year. Then in 1924-25 he became 
director of the Danish-Russian Import-Export Company, trading under the name 
Danrustorg, with oil-cakes and timber as the main items. The document then records 
that ‘at the present time’ Schou-Kjeldsen is the representative of a French firm 
‘Ursoforu’ (Société française pour le commerce avec la Russie et le pays’). There is no 
knowledge as to the creditworthiness of this company, the document goes on, but the 
impression is of a ‘new organisation of insignificant size.’ Schou-Kjeldsen is reported to 
have a current account in the foreign department of Gosbank, ‘from which it is evident 
that [he] possesses a certain amount of means.’  
 
These and other import and export activities kept Schou-Kjedsen busy and he travelled 
frequently between Soviet Russia, Denmark, Sweden, Finland Germany. He appears to 
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have made considerable sums of money selling icons and other religious artefacts, 
which he transported out of Soviet Russia, in train wagons. One wonders indeed 
whether he was ever regarded a spy by the GPU and its successor body, the NKVD. 
Had he stayed in Russia longer than 1934, Stalin’ s prosecutors would have had plenty 
of information at their disposal, which could be readily fabricated for purposes of arrest, 
incrimination and condemnation to a firing-squad.  
 
At all events in the mid 1920s the authorities to be sure were only too pleased to rid the 
‘scientific’ motherland of such ideologically undesirable items as religious 
paraphernalia.  Igor described his father at the time as ‘swimming in roubles.’ But 
Schou-Kjeldsen’s biggest business venture concerned a concession he obtained to 
manufacture and sell buttons in Russia. With his smart suits and dapper appearance, not 
to mention his two resplendent Hotchkisses, Schou-Kjeldsen was about to become a 
monopoly capitalist in the motherland of socialism. 
 
The monopoly capitalist 
 
One of his more remarkable ventures concerned the manufacture of buttons using 
bloodmeal, the dried blood of slaughtered cattle, as an ingredient. There is a somewhat 
unusual story to be told here. Apparently in 1925 or 26 he made the acquaintance of a 
German engineer, a certain Herr Winther who, as it happened, owned a button-making 
factory in Denmark. In and round Poltava in the Ukraine there were, according to 
Winther, some 10 slaughter-houses of various sizes. He had noted that the blood of 
slaughtered animals was discarded, the local people apparently not knowing that this 
by-product could be dried and used in powder form for industrial purposes such as 
button-making. So it was that in 1926 Schou-Kjeldsen and Winther started up a 
business making the buttons which were made in Leningrad using blood from 
slaughterhouses which had been dried in a drying plant built by the two partners in 
Poltava. Unfortunately there is nothing on record about the sheer logistics of 
transporting the dried blood to Leningrad. We can safely assume that by no means every 
consignment reached its destination. 
 
The two men went into business together trading under the name ‘O. Winther and H. 
Schou-Kjeldsen’, obtaining a concession in 1928 from the Soviet authorities to make 
buttons. Schou-Kjeldsen, given his knowledge of importing and exporting in Russia, 
was responsible for the commercial side of the operations, including the financing and 
securing of capital from investors. His partner handled the technical issues. The Soviet 
authorities granted the Dane and the German a 14 year concession to run the plant in 
Poltava and a 40 years’ concession to manufacture buttons in Leningrad.  
 
Pilot production was performed in Denmark, after which Schou-Kjeldsen brought over 
to Leningrad eight skilled workers from Denmark, some with their wives. When at last 
the entire venture was up and running, Schou-Kjeldsen should have been classed as an 
ideologically totally unacceptable person, for he was virtually a monopoly capitalism. 
Material in the Danish State Archive reveals that the relationship between Schou-
Kjeldsen and Winther became acrimonious. The culmination was a letter from Winther, 
dated 21 September 1928 and written in German, to the ‘Supreme Council of the 
National Economy’, complaining that Harald Schou-Kjeldsen has not fulfilled his 
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obligations as a ‘co-concessionary. Unfortunately, the archive does not contain Schou-
Kjeldsen’s response to the charges nor is there any evidence that the Supreme Council 
took any action. But it seems that Winther withdrew from the venture with Schou-
Kjeldsen. 
 
In the Danish State Archive there is a remarkable 11 page document in Danish, dated 10 
November 1930, which sheds considerable light on the operations of the button-making 
business. The document, which appears to be a report to the Main Committee for 
Concessions, is unsigned and bears the legend ‘translation from Russian.’ There are 
various references to ‘my concession’, and it seems reasonable to suppose that the 
author of the document was Harald Schou-Kjeldsen. He writes of ‘very great 
disappointment’ about the development of the business. The first problem concerns the 
supply of raw materials, namely blood-meal and the albumin obtained from it. 
Shortages forced him to lay off skilled workers, who at  peak time numbered some 350 
people,   and to use other ingredients which ultimately reduced product quality. The root 
of the problems was that other state institutions, which could easily override the needs 
of a foreign concession, also needed blood-meal. Some was needed for the manufacture 
of veneer; some of it was earmarked as an export commodity. There were problems too 
with importing foreign machinery for the blood-meal factory. For example, it took ten 
months for the order to be approved by the central authorities.  Then there was a 
shortage of briquettes for heating. 
 
Later in the document Schou-Kjeldsen takes the bold step of accusing ‘the majority of 
the responsible leaders in government institutions’ of liquidating private enterprise 
because ‘they will all obey the directives from Moscow despite the damage to local 
interests.’ In this respect particularly galling was that the three state organisations with 
the monopoly for purchasing haberdashery including buttons – Centrosoyuz, 
Mostorgsnab and Gum (the latter, of course, being Moscow’s leading department store) 
– had all refused to accept the concession’s new price list, which introduced higher 
prices for the first time since 1928.  
 
The litany continues with his frustrations about banks which ‘have been transformed 
into clearing houses which do not engage in handling money.’ His principal creditors 
took complete advantage of the laxness, failing to pay in accordance with the contract 
both as to time and to amount. Furthermore the banks provided Schou-Kjeldsen with no 
service when it came to financial transactions with foreign suppliers of chemicals, 
machinery and spare parts. Needless to say, the banks were not empowered to transfer 
foreign currency abroad. To add to his woes, Schou-Kjeldsen’s concession was hit by 
severe tax demands. At the end of 1929 his income tax on the company was raised from 
12% to 20% and in 1930 turnover tax jumped from 6.8% to 26.2%. 
 
Conceding the difficulties of operating as an entrepreneur ‘as per normal and 
successfully with all the changes afoot in the country’, Schou-Kjeldsen declares that it 
is possible, despite all these difficulties,  for the concession to be ‘a sound and viable 
entity in the Soviet economy provided that the government takes account of the 
concession’s special arrangements, surrounded as it is by a socialised working 
environment, and if the government undertakes the necessary steps to protect the 
concession’s best interests.’ He list nine key steps, which would seem reasonable under 
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friendly business conditions, but which were virtually unimplementable in the Soviet 
Union of 1930. He must have known it was too much to ask for regularisation of the 
supply situation, taxation relief, debt redistribution, and concessions concerning use of, 
and access to, foreign currency. 
 
This is a very intriguing document, showing how as of the late 1920s the noose of 
socialist centralisation was beginning to throttle Schou-Kjeldsen’s concession. The 
failure of supply of raw materials, the arbitrariness of legislation,  the bureaucratic foot-
dragging indifference, the disregard for local interests, the apparent penalisation of a 
foreign business enterprise, the lack of policy co-ordination, the inefficiencies and 
inertia of state monopolies the reduction of banks to mere clearing-houses – everything 
which Schou-Kjeldsen experienced would become par for the course for the remaining 
sixty years of existence of the Soviet Union – and beyond. 
 
 In the early 1930s the workers ‘suddenly sabotaged’ the facilities, which had the effect 
of halving output. As there is no reference to these acts of vandalism in Schou-
Kjeldsen’s long submission of November 1930 to the Main Committee for Concessions, 
we may assume that the trouble started after that. At all events these incidents prompted 
Schou-Kjeldsen to travel to Moscow to speak to some ‘senior gentlemen about the 
meaning of all this.’  Presumably these ‘senior’ gentlemen’ were that very committee. It 
transpired that the government would be happy to take over the factory before the 
appointed date of expiry of the concession.  It took two years to negotiate the 
liquidation contract. But once the terms of compensation had been agreed, the Soviet 
government paid the amount in full in foreign exchange over an eight years’ period. As 
for the sabotage, it seems impossible not to think that the vandalism had been instigated 
by the communist authorities.  
 
In 1934 Harald Schou-Kjeldsen and his wife were told to leave the USSR within two 
weeks or they would compulsorily become Soviet citizens.  Not everyone had the 
luxury of being given the chance to leave Stalin’s Soviet Russia. They left: of course. 
Schou-Kjeldsen resumed a business career in Denmark, but never returned to the Soviet 





The life and times of Harald Schou-Kjeldsen in Russia first from 1915 to 1919 and then 
from 1922 to 1934 have not been told in English before; nor in Danish, come to that. 
Schou-Kjeldsen was by any standard a remarkable business adventurer and his story 
contains many items of note to people interested in that epoch-making period of Russian 
– indeed world – history.  But there is more to him than his extraordinary life. He can 
indeed be taken as a role model for those dealing with  today’s Russia, which once The 
Financial Times described as a ‘cross-cultural mine-field.’  
 
Schou-Kjeldsen was a businessman of exceptional capability and resourcefulness, 
operating in a country which was officially and sometimes violently uncompromising in 
its opposition to everything which he, as an entrepreneur, represented. He knew 
Russians well, dealing with the powerful as well as arrays of underlings, whom he 
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learnt variously to brow-beat, humour and cajole. He spoke Russian fluently and 
everything we know about him suggests that he had the  knack of using that 
marvellously flexible tongue to suit the people and the occasion. One can readily 
imagine him using Russian shot through with charm, flattery and maybe with slightly 
ingratiating overtones so that the powerful feel even more powerful.  He plainly knew 
how to get doors opened, key documents signed and countersigned, secure favours, 
cement personal relationships, and to make himself trusted by his Russian contacts. 
 
He fully understood that Russia before the Revolution and the Russia in Soviet guise 
after 1917 was best understood as a network of interlocking patron-client relationships: 
which is still is today, of course. He knew how to present himself as knowledgeable, 
dependable, and sympathetic to Russian foibles and occasionally prickly sensibilities. 
He must have had a formidably patient negotiator, a tireless networker, an organiser of 






The provisional title of my book from which the above paper has been extracted is 
Harald Schou Kjeldsen: a Danish business adventurer in Russia 1915-193. A publisher is 
currently being sought. At the time of this writing (September 2001), I have made use of 
the following materials. 
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